Boeing's stock took a hit this week as the aerospace giant grappled with the fallout from an Alaska Airlines incident in January, where a door plug blew off a 737 Max shortly after takeoff. The company disclosed that missing paperwork and a lack of proper documentation were key factors in the mishap, prompting sharp rebukes from safety regulators.
At a briefing for journalists at Boeing's 737 Max factory in Renton, Washington, the company revealed that the incident was a result of four bolts not being installed on the door plug. Elizabeth Lund, senior vice president of quality for Boeing's commercial airplane unit, explained that the bolts were never installed because the necessary work order did not exist. This oversight left the plane vulnerable, and the door plug incident was "pretty much inevitable," she said.
The revelation led to immediate backlash from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which accused Boeing of releasing "non-public investigative information" and violating agency rules. The NTSB stated that Boeing's actions were a "blatant violation" of its regulations and announced it would refer Boeing's conduct to the Department of Justice. The NTSB also cut off Boeing's access to information generated during its ongoing investigation into the incident.
The issue with the door plug stemmed from a procedural failure on Boeing's assembly line. Two different groups of employees were involved: one removed the door plug to address rivet issues, but did not generate the necessary paperwork, and another group, assuming the work had been documented, reinstalled the plug without the bolts. This miscommunication and lack of documentation led to the door plug blowing out mid-flight, causing a significant safety hazard. Fortunately, no passengers were seriously injured, and the crew managed to land the plane safely.
Boeing is now facing multiple federal investigations and internal reviews aimed at improving quality control on its assembly lines. The company has already taken steps to address these issues, such as slowing down the speed of its assembly lines to ensure thorough inspections and proper documentation at each stage of production. "We have slowed down our factories to make sure this is under control," Lund said, expressing confidence that these measures will prevent future incidents.
In addition to these immediate actions, Boeing is rethinking its training programs for new hires. The company has been on a hiring spree to replace experienced workers who left during the COVID-19 pandemic. As part of this effort, Boeing has extended its foundational training from a maximum of 12 weeks to 14 weeks and introduced a formal mentoring program. "It worked before when we didn't have the high quantity of new people coming in," Lund noted, highlighting the need for more hands-on repetition and detailed instruction to ensure new employees are adequately prepared.
At the Boeing training center, new recruits like Derrick Farmer, an aviation mechanic with a nine-year tenure in the Army, are learning the intricacies of assembling aircraft. "Every bolt, every washer, every rivet, it all matters," Farmer said, emphasizing the high level of detail required in their work.
The focus on quality control extends to Boeing's suppliers as well. The company is in talks to buy most of Spirit AeroSystems, which builds the fuselage for the 737 in Wichita, Kansas. This acquisition aims to reduce production errors before fuselages arrive at Boeing's factory. Katie Ringgold, vice president and general manager of Boeing's 737 program, noted improvements in quality control but acknowledged that challenges remain.
Despite these efforts, the incident has underscored the need for robust oversight and rigorous standards in aircraft manufacturing. Federal regulators have limited Boeing's production of the 737 to 38 jets per month, and Ringgold emphasized that the company's current focus is on stabilizing production with an emphasis on safety and quality, rather than increasing output.
